Whether or not the marginal product of capital (MPK) differs across countries is a question that keeps coming up in discussions of comparative economic development and patterns of capital flows. We use easily accessible macroeconomic data to shed light on this issue, and find that MPKs are remarkably similar across countries. Hence, there is no prima facie support for the view that international credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital flows from rich to poor countries. Lower capital ratios in these countries are instead attributable to lower endowments of complementary factors and lower efficiency, as well as to lower prices of output goods relative to capital. We also show that properly accounting for the share of income accruing to reproducible capital is critical to reach these conclusions. One implication of our findings is that increased aid flows to developing countries will not significantly increase these countries' incomes.
Introduction
Is the world's capital stock efficiently allocated across countries? If so, then all countries have roughly the same aggregate marginal product of capital (M P K). If not, the M P K will vary substantially from country to country. In the latter case, the world foregoes an opportunity to increase global GDP by reallocating capital from low to high M P K countries. The policy implications are far reaching.
Given the enormous cross-country differences in observed capital-labor ratios (they vary by a factor of 100 in the data used in this paper) it may seem obvious that the M P K must vary dramatically as well. In this case we would have to conclude that there are important frictions in international capital markets that prevent an efficient crosscountry allocation of capital. 1 However, as Lucas (1990) pointed out in his celebrated article, poor countries also have lower endowments of factors complementary with physical capital, such as human capital, and lower total factor productivity (TFP).
Hence, large differences in capital-labor ratios may coexist with M P K equalization. 2 It is not surprising then that considerable effort and ingenuity have been devoted to the attempt to generate cross-country estimates of the M P K. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) present an exhaustive review of existing methods and results. Briefly, the literature has followed three approaches. The first is the cross-country comparison of interest rates. This is problematic because in financially repressed/distorted economies interest rates on financial assets may be very poor proxies for the cost of capital actually borne by firms. 3 The second is some variant of regressing ∆Y on ∆K for different sets of counties and comparing the coefficient on ∆K. Unfortunately, this approach typically relies on unrealistic identification assumptions. The third strategy 1 The credit-friction view has many vocal supporters. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , for example, build a strong case based on developing countries' histories of serial default, as well as evidence by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcam, and Volosovych (2003) and Lane (2003) linking institutional factors to capital flows to poorer economies. Another forceful exposition of the credit-friction view is in Stulz (2005) .
2 See also Mankiw (1995) , and the literature on development-accounting [surveyed in Caselli (2005) ], which documents these large differences in human capital and TFP. 3 Another issue is default. In particular, it is not uncommon for promised yields on "emerging market" bond instruments to exceed yields on US bonds by a factor of 2 or 3, but given the much higher risk these bonds carry it is possible that the expected cost of capital from the perspective of the borrower is considerably less. More generally, Mulligan (2002) shows that with uncertainty and taste shocks interest rates on any particular financial instruments may have very low -indeed even negative -correlations with the rental rate faced by firms.
is calibration, which involves choosing a functional form for the relationship between physical capital and output, as well as accurately measuring the additional complementary factors -such as human capital and TFP -that affect the M P K. Since giving a full account of the complementary factors is quite ambitious, one may not want to rely on this method exclusively. Both within and between these three broad approaches results vary widely. In sum, the effort to generate reliable comparisons of cross-country M P K differences has not yet paid off.
This paper presents estimates of the aggregate M P K for a large cross-section of countries, representing a broad sample of developing and developed economies. Relative to existing alternative measures, ours are extremely direct, impose extremely little structure on the data, and are extremely simple to calculate. The general idea is that under conditions approximating perfect competition on the capital market the M P K equals the rate of return to capital, and that the latter multiplied by the capital stock equals capital income. Hence, the aggregate marginal product of capital can be easily recovered from data on total income, the value of the capital stock, and the capital share in income. We then combine data on output and capital with data on the capital share to back out the M P K. 4
Our main result is that M P Ks are essentially equalized: the return from investing in capital is no higher in poor countries than in rich countries. This means that one can rationalize virtually all of the cross-country variation in capital per worker without appealing to international capital-market frictions. We also quantify the output losses due to the (minimal) M P K differences we observe: if we were to reallocate capital across countries so as to equalize M P Ks the corresponding change in world output would be negligible. 5 Consistent with the view that financial markets have become more integrated worldwide, however, we also find some evidence that the cost of credit frictions has declined over time.
The path to this result offers additional important insights. We start from a "naive" estimate of the M P K that is derived from the standard neoclassical one-sector model, with labor and reproducible capital as the only inputs. Using this initial measure, the average M P K in the developing economies in our sample is more than twice 4 Mulligan (2002) performs an analogous calculation to identify the rental rate in the US time series.
He finds implicit support for this method in the fact that the rental rate thus calculated is a much better predictor of consumption growth than interest rates on financial assets. 5 Our counter-factual calculations of the consequences of full capital mobility for world GDP are analogous to those of Klein and Ventura (2004) for labor mobility.
as large as in the developed economies. Furthermore, within the developing-country sample the M P K is three times as variable as within the developed-country sample.
When we quantify the output losses associated with these M P K differentials we find that they are very large (about 25 percent of the aggregate GDP of the developing countries in our sample). These results seem at first glance to represent a big win for the international credit-friction view of the world. The further and final blow to the credit-friction hypothesis comes from generalizing the model to allow for multiple sectors. In a multi-sector world the estimate of M P K based on the one-sector model (with or without natural capital) is -at besta proxy for the average physical M P K across sectors. But with many sectors physical M P K differences can be sustained even in a world completely unencumbered by any form of capital-market friction. In particular, even if poor-country agents have access to unlimited borrowing and lending at the same conditions offered to rich-country agents, the physical M P K will be higher in poor countries if the relative price of capital goods is higher there. Intuitively, poor-country investors in physical capital need to be compensated by a higher physical M P K for the fact that capital is more expensive there 6 We are immensely grateful to Pete Klenow and two referees for bringing up the issue of land and natural resources. Incidentally, these observations extend to a criticism of much work that has automatically plugged in standard capital-share estimates in empirical applications of models where all capital is reproducible. We plan to pursue this criticism in future work.
(relative to output). Or, yet in other words, the physical M P K measures output per unit of physical capital invested, while for the purposes of cross-country credit flows one wants to look at output per unit of output invested. Accordingly, when we correct our measure to capture the higher relative cost of capital in poor countries we reach our result of M P K equalization. 7
We close the paper by returning to Lucas' question as to the sources of differ- The important role of the relative price of capital in our analysis underscores the close relationship of our contribution with an influential recent paper by Hsieh and Klenow (2003) . Hsieh and Klenow show, among other things, that the relative price of output is the key source for the observed positive correlation of real investment rates and per-capita income, despite roughly constant investment rates in domestic prices. We extend their results by drawing out their implications -together with appropriately-measured reproducible capital shares -for rates of return differentials, 7 In a paper largely addressing other issues, Taylor (1998) has a section which makes the same basic point about price differences and returns to capital, and presents similar calculations for the M P Ks. Our paper still differs considerably in that it provides a more rigorous theoretical underpinning for the exercise; it provides a quantitative model-based assessment of the deadweight costs of credit frictions; and it presents a decomposition of the role of relative prices v. other factors in explaining crosscountry differences in capital-labor ratios. Perhaps most importantly, in this paper we use actual data on reproducible capital shares instead of assuming that these are constant across countries and equal to the total capital share. This turns out to be quite important. Cohen and Soto (2002) also briefly observe that the data may be roughly consistent with rate of return equalization. 8 A small role is also played by cross-country differences in the reproducible-capital share in income.
4 and the debate on the missing capital flows to developing countries. 9
Our results have implications for the recently-revived policy debate on financial aid to developing countries. The existence of large physical M P K differentials between poor and rich countries would usually be interpreted as prima facie support to the view that increased aid flows may be beneficial. But such an interpretation hinges on a credit-friction explanation for such differentials. Our result that financial rates of return are fairly similar in rich and poor countries, instead, implies that any additional flow of resources to developing countries is likely to be offset by private flows in the opposite direction seeking to restore rate-of-return equalization. 10 2 M P K Differentials 
(1) 9 Another important contribution of Hsieh and Klenow (2003) is to propose an explanation for the observed pattern of relative prices. In their view poor countries have relatively lower TFP in producing (largely tradable) capital goods than in producing (partially non-tradable) consumption goods. Another possible explanation is that poor countries tax sales of machinery relatively more than sales of final goods [e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996) ]. Relative price differences may also reflect differences in the composition of output or in unmeasured quality. None of our conclusions in this paper is affected by which of these explanations is the correct one, so we do not take a stand on this. 10 Our conclusion that a more integrated world financial market would not lead to major changes in world output is in a sense stronger than Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) 's conclusion that the welfare effects of capital-account openness are small. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) find large (calibrated) M P K differentials, and consequently predict large capital inflows following capital-account liberalization. However, they point out that in welfare terms this merely accelerates a process of convergence to a steady state that is independent of whether the capital-account is open or closed. Hence, the discounted welfare gains are modest. Our point is that, even though differences in physical M P Ks are large, differences in rates of return are small, so we should not even expect much of a reallocation of capital in the first place.
In the macro-development literature it is common to back out the "capital share" as one minus available estimates of the labor share in income (we review these data below). But such figures include payments accruing to both reproducible and nonreproducible capital, i.e. land and natural resources. By contrast, the standard measure of the capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method from investment flows, and therefore represents only the reproducible capital stock. As is clear from the formula above, therefore, using standard measures of α leads to an overestimate of the marginal productivity of reproducible capital. In turn, this bias on the estimated levels of the M P Ks will translate into a twofold bias in cross-country comparisons.
First, it will exaggerate absolute differences in M P K, which is typically the kind of differences we are interested in when comparing rates of return on assets (interest-rate spreads, for example, are absolute differences). 11 Second, and most importantly, since the agricultural and natural-resource sectors represent a much larger share of GDP in poor countries, the overestimate of the M P K when using the total capital share is much more severe in such countries, and cross-country differences will once again be inflated (both in absolute and in relative terms).
Of course equation (1) holds (as long as there is only one sector) whether or not non-reproducible capital enters the production function or not. The only thing that changes is the interpretation of α. Hence, these considerations lead us to two possible estimates of the M P K:
In these formulas, Y and K are, respectively, estimates of real output and the reproduciblecapital stock; α w is one minus the labor share (the standard measure of the capital share); and α k is an estimate of the reproducible-capital share in income. The suffix "N " in the first measure is a mnemonic for "naive," while the suffix "L" in the second stands for "land and natural-resource corrected."
It is important to observe that, relative to alternative estimates in the literature, 11 As an example, suppose that all countries have the same share of land and natural resources in the total capital share, say 20%. Using the total-capital share instead of the reproducible-capital will simply increase all the M P Ks by the same proportion. If the US' "true" M P K is 8% and India's 16% (a spread of 8 percentage points), the M P Ks computed with the total capital share are 10% and 20% (a spread of 10 percentage points).
6 this method of calculating M P K requires no functional form assumptions (other than linear homogeneity), much less that we come up with estimates of human capital, TFP, or other factors that affect a country's M P K. Furthermore, the assumptions we do make are typically shared by the other approaches to M P K estimation, so the set of restrictions we impose is a strict subset of those imposed elsewhere. 12 This calculation is a useful basis for our other calculations because it encompasses the most conventional set of assumptions in the growth literature.
M P K Differentials in a Multi-Sector Model
The calculations suggested above are potentially biased because they ignore an important fact -the price of capital relative to the price of consumption goods is higher in poor countries than in rich countries. To see why this matters consider an economy that produces J final goods. Each final good is produced using capital and other factors, which we don't need to specify. The only technological restriction is that each of the final goods is produced under constant returns to scale. The only institutional restriction is that there is perfect competition in good and factor markets within each country. Capital may be produced domestically (in which case it is one of the J final goods), imported, or both. Similarly, it does not matter whether the other final goods produced domestically are tradable or not.
Consider the decision by a firm or a household to purchase a piece of equipment and use it in the production of one of the final goods, say good 1. The return from
where P 1 (t) is the domestic price of good 1 at time t, P k (t) is the domestic price of capital goods, δ is the depreciation rate, and M P K 1 is the physical marginal product of capital in the production of good 1. When do we have frictionless international capital markets? When the firms/households contemplating this investment in all countries have access to an alternative investment opportunity, that yields a common world interest rate R * . Abstracting for simplicity from capital gains, then, frictionless international capital markets imply
Hence, frictionless international credit markets imply that the value of the marginal product of capital in any particular final good, divided by the price of capital, is constant across countries.
To bring this condition to the data let us first note that total capital income is j P j M P K j K j , where K j is the amount of capital used in producing good j. If capital is efficiently allocated domestically, we also have P j M P K j = P 1 M P K 1 , so total capital income is P 1 M P K 1 j K j = P 1 M P K 1 K, where K is the total capital stock in operation in the country. Given that capital income is P 1 M P K 1 K, the capital share
Hence, the following holds:
In other words, the multi-sector model recommends a measure of the marginal product of capital that is easily backed out from an estimate of the capital share in income, α, GDP at domestic prices, P y Y , and the capital-stock at domestic prices, P k K. Comparing this with the estimate suggested by the one-sector model [equation (1)] we see that the difference lies in correcting for the relative price of final-to-capital goods, P y /P k .
It should be clear that this correction is fundamental to properly assess the hypothesis that international credit markets are frictionless.
All of the above goes through whether or not reproducible capital is the only recipient of non-labor income or not. Again, the only difference is in the interpretation of the capital share α. Hence, we come to our third and fourth possible estimates of the M P K:
is a measure of the average price of final goods relative to the price of reproducible capital, and the prefix "P " stands for "price-corrected." 13 13 Since in our model P j M P K j is equalized across sectors j, the physical M P K in any particular sector will be an inverse function of the price of output in that sector. Since the relative price of capital is high in poor countries, this is consistent with the conjecture of Hsieh and Klenow (2003) that relative productivity in the capital goods producing sectors is low in poor countries.
Notice that the one-sector based measures, M P KN and M P KL, retain some interest even in the multi-sector context. In particular, one can show that
In words, the product of the capital share and real income, divided by the capital stock, tends to increase when physical marginal products tend to be high on average
in the various sectors. 14 Hence, the one-sector based measures offer some quantitative assessment of cross-country differences in the average physical M P K.
Data
Our data on Y , K, P y , and P k come (directly or indirectly) from Version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables [PWT, Heston, Summers, and Aten (2004)]. Briefly, Y is GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1996. K is constructed with the perpetual inventory method from time series data on real investment (also from the PWT) using a depreciation rate of 0.06 [see Caselli (2005) for more details]. 15 P y is essentially a weighted average of final-good domestic prices, while P k is a weighted average of domestic equipment prices. The list of final and equipment goods to be included in the measure is constant across countries. Hence, P y /P k is a summary measure of the prices of final goods relative to equipment goods. As many authors have already pointed out, capital goods are relatively more expensive in poor countries, so the free capital flows condition modified to take account of relative equipment prices should fit the data better than the unmodified condition if the physical M P K tends to be higher in poor countries. 16
14 To obtain this expression start out by the definition of P y , which is
Then substitute P j = αP y Y M P Kj K from the last equation in the text, and rearrange. 15 A potential bias arises if the depreciation rate δ differs across countries, perhaps because of differences in the composition of investment, or because the natural environment is more or less forgiving. In particular we will overestimate the capital stock of countries with high depreciation rates, and therefore underestimate their M P K. However notice from equation (2) that countries with a high depreciation rates should have higher M P Ks. In other words variation in δ biases both sides of (2) in the same direction.
16 See, e.g., Barro (1991) , Jones (1994) , and Hsieh and Klenow (2003) for further discussions of the price data.
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The total capital share, α w is taken from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) , who build upon and expand upon the influential work of Gollin (2002) . As mentioned, these estimates compute the capital share as one minus the labor share in GDP. In turn, the labor share is employee compensation in the corporate sector from the National Ac- 
We can therefore back out an estimate of α k from α w as estimated by Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) and P k K/W as estimated by the World Bank.
Since the World Bank's data on land and natural-resource wealth is by far the newest and least familiar among those used in this paper, a few more words to describe these data are probably in order. The general approach is to estimate the value of rents from a particular form of capital and then capitalize this value using a fixed discount rate. In most cases, the measure of rents is based on the value of output from that form 17 Bernanke and Gürkaynak use similar methods as Gollin, but their data set includes a few more countries. The numbers are straight from Table X in the Bernanke and Gürkaynak paper. Their preferred estimates are reported in the column labeled "Actual OSPUE," and they are constructed by assigning to labor a share of the Operating Surplus of Private Unincorporate Enterprises equal to the share of labor in the corporate (and public) sector. We use these data wherever they are available. When "Actual OSPUE" is not available we take the data from the column "Imputed OSPUE," which is constructed as "Actual OSPUE," except that the OSPUE measure is estimated by breaking down the sum of OSPUE and total corporate income by assuming that the share of corporate income in total income is the same as the share of corporate labor in total labor. Finally, when this measure, is also unavailable, we get the data from the "LF" column, which assumes that average labor income in the non-corporate sector equals average labor income in the corporate sector. When we use Gollin's estimates we get very much the same results.
of capital in a given year. For subsoil resources, the World Bank also needs to estimate the future growth of rents and a time horizon to depletion. For forest products, rents are estimated as the value of timber produced (at local market prices where possible) minus an estimate of the cost of production. Adjustments are made for sustainability based on the volume of production and total amount of usable timberland. The rents to other forest resources are estimated as fixed value per acre for all non-timber forest. Rents from cropland are estimated as the value of agricultural output minus production costs. There are a number of studies from the 60's and 70's which perform similar exercises on a variety of countries. Raymond W. Goldsmith collects some of these in Goldsmith (1985) . He finds land shares in total capital in 1978 that average about 20% across a group of mostly rich countries. With the exception of Japan at 51%,the figures range from 12% to 27%. 18 This range is once again broadly consistent with the World Bank data.
The data from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) puts the heaviest constraints on the sample size, so that we end up with 53 countries. 19 The entire data set is reported in Appendix 
M P K Results
In this section we present our four estimates of the M P K. To recap, the naive version, M P KN , does not account for difference in prices of capital and consumption goods, and also uses the total share of capital, not the share of reproducible capital. This calculation is the simplest and will be used as a benchmark for the corrected versions.
M P KL is calculated using the share of reproducible capital rather than the share of total capital. P M P KN is adjusted to account for differences in prices between capital and consumption goods, but reverts to the total capital share. Finally P M P KL, the "right" estimate, includes both the price adjustment and the natural capital adjustment. These four different versions of the implied M P Ks are reported in Appendix This first simple calculation implies that the aggregate marginal product of capital is high and highly variable in poor countries, and low and fairly uniform in rich countries. If we were to stop here, it would be tempting to conclude that capital flows fairly freely among the rich countries, but not towards and among the poor countries.
This looks like a big win for the credit friction answer to the Lucas question.
Once one accounts for prices and the share of natural capital a different story emerges. Figure 1 shows that each of the adjustments reduces the variance of the marginal product considerably and reduces the differences between the rich and poor countries. Taking both adjustments together eliminates the variance almost completely and the rich countries actually have a higher marginal product on average than the poor countries. Table 2 summarizes the average marginal products for each of our 13 calculation for poor and rich countries. The differences between the poor and rich countries are significant for the first three rows of the table. For the case using both corrections, the difference is only significant at the 10% level.
Interestingly, with both adjustments there is a positive and significant relation- 
Assessing the Costs of Credit Frictions
The existence of any cross-country differences in M P K suggests inefficiencies in the world allocation of capital. How severe are these frictions? One possible way to answer this question is to compute the amount of GDP the world fails to produce as a consequence. In particular, we perform the counter-factual experiment of reallocating the world capital stock so as to achieve M P K equalization under our various measures.
We then compare world output under this reallocation to actual world output. The difference is a measure of the deadweight loss from the failure to equalize M P Ks.
We stress that this is not a normative exercise: our capital reallocation is not a policy proposal. The observed distribution of output is an equilibrium outcome given certain distortions that prevent M P K equalization. The point of this exercise is to assess the welfare losses the world experiences relative to a frictionless first best, not that the first best is easily achievable by moving some capital around.
While our M P K estimates are free of functional form assumptions, in order to perform our counterfactual calculations me must now choose a specific production function. We thus fall back on the standard Cobb-Douglas workhorse. Industry j in country i has the production function
where Z ij is the quantity of natural capital, K ij the reproducible capital stock, L ij the input of labor, β ij is the share of natural capital in sector j in country i and X ij is a summary measure of technology and is also sector and country specific. The derivation below makes it clear that to pursue our calculations we must assume that the reproducible-capital share in country i, α i , is the same across all sectors (though it can vary across countries).
The marginal product of capital in sector j in country i is
Taking into account the relative prices of capital and consumption goods, rates of return within a country are equalized when
Suppose now that capital was reallocated across countries in such a way that P M P K i took the same value, P M P K * , in all countries. Assuming for the time being that Z ij , and L ij are unchanged in response to our counterfactual reshuffling of capital (we will check this is indeed the case later in the section), the new value of K ij , K * ij , satisfies 20
Dividing (5) by (4) we have 20 For the remainder of this section, expressions relating to P M P K equalization can be simplified to expressions for M P K equalization by assuming P k = P y . Calculations will be performed for both cases.
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which shows that capital increases or decreases by the same proportion in each sector.
Earlier we made the conjecture that all adjustment to the equalization of P M P Ks was through the capital stock, and not through reallocations of labor or natural capital. Under this conjecture, since the amount of capital per worker changes by the same factor in each sector, the marginal products of labor and natural capital must do the same. Hence, even if labor is not a specific factor, as long as its allocation across sectors depends on relative wages, there will be no reshuffling of workers across sectors. 21 The same is true of natural capital.
We can now aggregate the sectorial capital stocks to the country level:
In order to close the model we need to impose a resource constraint. The resource constraint is that the world sum of counter-factual capital stocks is equal to the existing world endowment of reproducible capital, or
Taking the values for P M P K i calculated in the previous section, the only unknown in (7) is P M P K * , which can be solved for with a simple non-linear numerical routine.
To recap, P M P K * is the common world rate of return to capital that would prevail if the existing world capital stock were allocated optimally. 22
Counterfactual Capital Stocks
With the counterfactual world rate of return, P M P K * , at hand we can use equation (6) to back out each country's assigned capital stock when rates of return are equalized.
As with our initial M P K calculations, four variations are calculated. The base version, labeled M P KN , is calculated under the assumption that P k = P y and uses the total share of capital, not correcting for natural capital (i.e. it sets β ij = 0). M P KL 21 In particular, our experiment is consistent with wage equalization across sectors, but also with models in which inter-sectoral migration frictions imply fixed proportional wedges among different sectors' wages. 22 Removing the frictions that prevent P M P K equalization would almost certainly also lead to an increase in the world aggregate capital stock. Our calculations clearly abstract from this additional benefit, and are therefore a lower bound on the welfare cost of such frictions.
is calculated using the share of reproducible capital rather than the share of total capital. P M P KN allows for differences in prices. P M P KL includes both the price adjustment and the natural capital adjustment. Figure 2 plots the resulting counterfactual distributions of capital-labor ratios against the actual distribution. The solid lines are 45-degree lines. 
Counterfactual Output
The effect on output of our counter-factual reallocation of the capital stock is easily calculated. Substituting K * ij into the production function (3), we get Notes: see Table 2 Since all sectorial outputs go up by the same proportion, aggregate output also goes up by the same proportion, and we have
Hence, plugging values for α i , P M P K i and P M P K * we can back out the counterfactual values of each country's GDP under our various M P K equalization counterfactuals. These values are plotted in Figure 3 , again together with a 45-degree line. Table   4 summarizes the change in output per worker under the various calculations.
Changes in output in our counterfactual world are obviously consistent with the result for capital-labor ratios. For our naive M P K measure, developing countries tend to experience increases in GDP, and rich countries declines. The average developing country experiences a 77 percent gain, while the average developed country only "loses" 3 percent. These numbers fall dramatically when adjustments are made for relative capital prices and natural capital, with increases of less than 25% in both cases. For the scenario with both adjustments, average output in the two groups is essentially unchanged.
Dead Weight Losses
To provide a comprehensive summary measure of the deadweight loss from the failure of M P Ks to equalize across countries we compute the percentage difference between world output in the counterfactual case and actual world output, or
This can be calculated for each of our measures of the marginal product. Table 5 summarizes this calculation for our four calculation methods.
For the naive M P K calculation, the result is in the order of 0.03, or world output would increase by 3 percent if we redistributed physical capital so as to equalize the M P K. This number is large. To put it in perspective, consider that the 28 developing Once one adjusts for price differences and natural capital, however, the picture changes substantially. The natural-capital adjustment alone reduces the dead weight loss to less than a quarter of the base case. The price adjustment alone reduces the dead weight losses by over half. Taken together, the dead weight loss is negligible.
In these calculations, the natural-capital adjustment appears to be of greater importance than the price adjustment. This was not the case for the M P K calculations. This is because the capital adjustment reduces the dead weight losses in two ways. First, like the price adjustment, the natural-capital adjustment tends to reduce the gap between rich and poor M P K. Unlike the price adjustment, the natural capital adjustment reduces the share of capital for our deadweight loss calculations for all countries. This reduces the sensitivity of output to reallocations of capital and reduces the dead weight losses further. This can be seen in Table 6 which lists the counter-factual M P K for each of our cases. 
Explaining Differences in Capital-Labor Ratios
Since we find essentially no difference in (properly measured) M P Ks between poor and rich countries, we end up siding with Lucas on the (un)importance of international credit frictions as a source of differences in capital-labor ratios. But our results also call for some qualifications to Lucas' preferred explanation, namely that rich countries had a greater abundance of factors complementary to reproducible capital, or higher levels of TFP. These factors certainly play a role, but another important proximate cause is the international variation in the relative price of equipment.
We cannot accurately apportion the relative contribution of prices and other (Lucas) factors without data on each sector's price P ij , efficiency, X ij , and naturalcapital share, β ij . But a rough approximation to a decomposition can be produced by focusing on a very special case, in which each country produces only one output good.
In this example, clearly, most countries import their capital. 23 With this (admittedly very strong) assumption, we can rearrange equation (5) to read
where
where k * i is the ratio of reproducible-capital to labor and z i is the ratio of naturalcapital to labor. The first term captures the effect of variation in relative prices (and capital shares) on the capital-labor ratio. The second term captures the traditional complementary factors identified by Lucas. In the simplest case where α i and the price ratio are assumed to be the same in all countries, all the variance of capital per worker in a world with perfect mobility would be due to differences in Λ.
In equation (8) the term Π i is available from our previous calculations, so we can , back out the term Λ i as k * i /Π i . Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) we can then take the log and variance of both sides to arrive at the decomposition:
The variance of log(k * ) for our P M P KL case is 2.46, the variance of log(Π) is 0.82, the variance of log(Λ) is 0.61, and the covariance term is 0.52. If we apportion the covariance term across Π and Λ equally this suggests that 54% of the variance in k * is due to differences in Π and 46% is due to differences in Λ. Each obviously plays a large role and they are clearly interconnected (the simple correlation between them is
0.73). 24
This should come as no large surprise. Hsieh and Klenow (2003) argue that differences in the price ratio are due to relatively low productivity in the capital producing sectors in developing countries. Since Λ in our formulation is comprised of an amalgam of human capital and total factor productivity, it should not be surprising that low Λ correlates with an unfavorable price ratio. Similarly, the proportion of output in land and natural resources will tend to be larger in poor countries, simply because they produce less total output. With rising incomes we would expect to see that proportion fall. The ultimate cause of differences in capital per worker may therefore be productivity differences if productivity differences are the ultimate cause of differences in capital costs and the share of capital. However, failure to account for these factors will falsely suggest that financial frictions play a large role.
Time Series Results
In this section we attempt a brief look at the evolution over time of our deadweight loss measures. The results should be taken with great caution for two reasons. First, they are predicated on estimates of the capital stock. Since the capital stocks are a function of time series data on investment, the capital stock numbers become increasingly unreliable as we proceed backward in time. Second, our estimates of capital's share of income are from a single year, so changes over time are not reflected. This is a particular problem in the case of the calculations corrected for natural capital. The share of natural resources was particularly volatile during this period and this is not properly accounted for in the results.
With these important caveats, Figure 4 displays the time series evolution of the world's deadweight loss from M P K differentials. We find little -or perhaps a slightly increasing -long-run trend in the deadweight loss from failure to equalize M P KN .
Once prices are accounted for, however, it appears that the size of the deadweight losses have fallen somewhat over time. Adding in the correction for natural capital causes the trend to be clearly downward. This provides tentative evidence that the deadweight loss from failure to equalize financial returns -the cost of credit frictions -has fallen somewhat over time. This latter result is consistent with the view that world financial markets have become increasingly integrated. 25
Conclusions
Macroeconomic data on aggregate output, reproducible capital stocks, final-good prices relative to reproducible-capital prices, and the share of reproducible capital in GDP are remarkably consistent with the view that international financial markets do a very efficient job at allocating capital across countries. Developing countries are not starved of capital because of credit-market frictions. Rather, the proximate causes of low capital-labor ratios in developing countries are that these countries have low levels of complementary factors and are inefficient users of such factors [as Lucas (1990) suspected], and that they have high prices of equipment relative to output. As a result, increased aid flows to developing countries are unlikely to have much impact on capital stocks and output, unless they are accompanied by a return to financial repression, and in particular to an effective ban on capital outflows in these countries. Even in that case, increased aid flows would be a move towards inefficiency, and not increased efficiency, in the international allocation of capital. 
where t k is an "effective physical-capital income tax rate," t * as an "effective financialcapital income tax," and for simplicity we assume that each country produces only one final good. While macroeconomists are not used to draw distinctions between types of capital-income taxes, anecdotal evidence from developing countries suggests that physical capital installed domestically is more easily targeted by the tax authorities than various forms of financial investment, especially in offshore accounts. This is even more likely if one takes a broad view of physical-capital income taxation that includes expropriation by rent seeking governments, and of financial-capital income as more easily hidden from the tax authorities. 26
While we do not have direct data on t k and t * , it seems very likely that the former is large in poor countries (partly as a result of corruption and rent seeking), and the latter is smaller in poor countries (largely as the result of greater opportunities for tax evasion). Combined with our result in this paper that P y M P K/P k varies little across countries, this implies that aid flows and financial repression in developing countries may already have created a situation in which there is "too much" capital there. This seems an area of potentially fruitful future research. 
